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FUTURE CHALLENGES: NEW SUBSTANTIVE AREAS

Environment and Health Under
WTO Dispute Settlement
STEVE CHARNOVITZ*

I. Introduction
A few years ago, E.U. Petersmann pointed out that "the GATT dispute settlement system has been used more frequently for the settlement of 'environmental
disputes' between States than any other international dispute settlement mechanism. "' This trend continues in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus,
the first decision under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
was, not surprisingly, an environmental dispute. In addition, the WTO issued a
health-related decision and will soon resolve an environmental dispute regarding
sea turtles. In just three years, the environmental jurisprudence of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) put forth important changes. These
changes involve both substance-that is, the trade disciplines to be applied-and
process-how panels reach decisions.
The core issue before WTO panels is the acceptability of laissez-rggler. This
term, introduced by Joel Trachtman, captures the underlying question of WTO
adjudication. 2 That is, when will the trading system override national autonomy
in choosing environmental and health policy? The question can be reformulated
to one about federalism: what is
the appropriate level of governmental decisions
3
to regulate or not to regulate?
*Steve Charnovitz is Director, Global Environment & Trade Study, Yale University. Funding
for this research was provided by The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The author
wishes to thank J. Martin Wagner for his helpful comments.
1. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL

22 (1995).
2. Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, EUR.

LAW AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND

J. INT'L L. 32, 37 (1998).

3. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. REV.
1283 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996).
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Part II of this article examines the substantive impact of WTO jurisprudence
on environmental issues. Part III examines procedural points involved in environmental dispute settlement and makes several recommendations.
II. Substantive Implications for the Environment
The first two sections of Part II discuss how the WTO oversees domestic
environmental and health policy. Although there is no fine line between environment and health, it is useful to separate these sections in view of the different
WTO agreements involved. Section three briefly looks at WTO constraints on
international environmental policy.
A. WTO

CONSTRAINTS ON DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Public interest groups are concerned that WTO rules place too much constraint
on domestic environmental policy. 4 In 1992, the GATT Secretariat opined that:
"GATT rules, therefore, place essentially no constraints on a country's right to
protect its own environment against damage from either domestic production or the
consumption of domestically produced or imported products." 5 Subsequent GATT
and WTO panel decisions, however, have rendered that statement less credible.
1. Article III
Environmental protection is carried out through environmental policy-namely
through the instruments-taxes and regulations. 6 GATT article III places limits
on when these instruments can be applied to imported products. Article III:2's
first sentence states that imported products shall not be subject to internal taxes
in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Article
111:2's second sentence states that internal taxes shall not be applied in a manner
inconsistent with article 111: 1-that is,not applied to imported products "so as
to afford protection to domestic production." 7 Moreover, this second sentence
is triggered not only to compare like products, but also to compare imported
products "directly competitive or substitutable" with domestic products "not
similarly taxed." ' Article 111:4 states that imported products shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin
in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
4. See, e.g., Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order,
WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION 221-25 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1998).
5. 1 INT'L TRADE 1990-91 at 23 (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1992). See also
WTO Chief Says Body Will Not Impinge on Members' Rights to Protect Environment, 20 INT'L.
ENVT. REP. 1114 (1997).
6. See generally R. KERRY TURNER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (1993).
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, article III [hereinafter GATT].
8. GATT, article 111(2).
in
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Before the advent of the WTO, GATT jurisprudence was well settled that an
explicitly discriminatory measure violates article Ill. 9 However, several unsettled
points exist. For example, when does an implicitly discriminatory measure violate
article III? ° In addition, how should panels decide whether two similar products
are like or unlike?
WTO jurisprudence has clarified article III in some ways. In the U.S. Gasoline
decision, the panel declared that article 11I:4 "does not allow less favourable
treatment dependent on the characteristics of the producer and the nature of the
data held by it."" The panel did not explain article III:4's failure to allow this
treatment. Presumably it believed that gasoline from Producer A with a lot of
data is a "like" product to gasoline from Producer B with no data. The panel
characterizes producer characteristics as "extraneous" to the ascertainment of
product likeness. 2 Therefore, by giving this broad interpretation to article III:
4, the WTO makes it harder for governments to design workable regulatory
measures. Environmental regulators may have many reasons to treat gasoline
differently depending on a refinery's pollution profile, its compliance records,
and the quality of its recording-keeping. Similarly, trade regulators or customs
agencies may want to treat products differently depending on whether the producer
has a license to use a trademark or a copyright.
The WTO Gasolinedecision may also have implications for GATT article III:
2. In the U.S. Automobile Taxes case, the panel considered a gas guzzler tax
3
linked to the fuel economy of the model type, not the individual automobile.
The panel concluded that, contrary to the argument put forth by the plaintiff
European Commission, an imported automobile whose model type had a fuel
economy below 22.5 miles per gallon was not a like product to a domestic automobile whose model type had a fuel economy above 22.5. Moreover, this was the
result even if the actual fuel economy of a particular domestic automobile (rather
than its model type) was below 22.5. 14 The panel's report was not adopted by
the GATT Council because of opposition by the European Commission. If the
European Commission were to lodge the same complaint before the WTO today,

9. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 150, 169
(1995) [hereinafter GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE] (discussing the Petroleum and Section
337 decisions). Explicit discrimination is also called facial or de jure discrimination.
10. Other terms that are used for implicit discrimination include de facto and origin neutral.
For a discussion of this issue under GATT law, see Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, GAIT
Legal Restraints on Domestic Environmental Regulations, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION:
PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 76-80 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
11. UnitedStates-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, May 30, 1997, para.
6.11, 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996) [hereinafter Gasoline Panel Report]. This particular ruling was not
appealed by the U.S. government.
12. Id. para. 6.12.
13. United States-Taxes on Automobiles, Nov. 1, 1994, para. 5.18, 33 I.L.M. 1397 (1994)
[hereinafter Taxes on Automobiles].
14. Id.para. 5.32.
FALL 1998
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after Gasoline, a panel might consider the fuel economy of the model type to
be an "extraneous factor" under article 111:2.
Another issue involved in the gas guzzler dispute was whether the zero tax rate
on domestic light trucks with low fuel economy violated article 111:2 when imported
automobiles with the same fuel economy had a high tax rate. To ascertain whether
these two products were "like," the Automobile Taxes panel looked at the "aim
and effect" of the tax measure in dispute.' 5 According to the panel, "Article III
should be analyzed primarily in terms of whether less favourable treatment was
taken so as to afford protection to domestic production." 16 This accorded with the
U.S. AlcoholicBeverages panel's statement that "it is imperative that the like product determination in the context of Article III be made in such a way that it not
unnecessarily infringe upon the regulatory authority and domestic policy options
of contracting parties. " " Because the Automobile Taxes panel found that the U.S.
government's policy of treating light trucks and regular automobiles differently did
not have the "aim" of affording protection or the "effect" of altering competitive
conditions between imported and domestic products, the panel concluded that light
trucks and regular automobiles were not like products.
This GATT jurisprudence has been altered by the WTO. A key issue in the
Japan AlcoholicBeverages case was whether chemically different alcoholic beverages were like products.' 8 Both plaintiff Japan and defendant United States used
the so-called aim-and-effect test to argue their position.' 9 But, the panel rejected
the aim-and-effect test2° and then ruled that shochu and vodka were like products."
According to the panel, likeness should not be conditioned on "whether domestic

15. Id. para. 5.9. "Aim" was to be ascertained through the wording of the legislation as a
whole. Id. para. 5.12. The panel should ask whether a change in competitive conditions in favor
of domestic products was a desired outcome and not merely an incidental consequence. Id. para.
5.10. "Effect" was to be ascertained by examining the market for a change in the conditions of
competition. Id. paras. 5.13-5.14. It is unclear whether the panel intended the test to be conjunctive
or disjunctive.
16. Id. para. 5.9.
17. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206, 294, para. 5.72 (1992).
18. Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Panel, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS 1O/R, WT/
DS I /R(July 11, 1996) (visitedJune 29, 1998) < http://www/wto.org/wto/online/ddf.htm > [hereinafter Alcoholic Beverages Panel Report].
19. Id. para. 6.15.
20. Id. para. 6.17. The panel explained its decision by suggesting that if a government alleged
a non-protectionist reason for a measure, say health, then the standard of proof required in article
XX would be circumvented by using an aim-and-effect test in article III. In other words, article III
would be permitting a measure that might be disallowable under article XX. The panel suggested
that this would render article XX redundant. Id. para. 6.17 & n. 89. The panel's analysis is circular.
Article XX will only be potentially useful for discriminatory health measures. Non-discriminatory

health measures do not violate article III. See

JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
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(1992). Of course, panels have to ascertain whether particular health measures are discriminatory,
but the existence of article XX should not make it easier for panels to find article III violations.
21. Alcoholic Beverages Panel Report, supra note 18, para. 7. 1(i). This conclusion was affirmed
by the Appellate Body.
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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legislation operates so as to afford protection to domestic production.' 22 This
revised interpretation of likeness has important implications for environmental
disputes. Future panels might consider a beer can to be a like product to a beer
bottle, a non-refillable container to be a like product to a refillable one,23 or a
biodegradable package to be a like product to a non-biodegradable package. If
so, reasonable environmental taxes and regulations could be held in violation of
article 111.24
The Canada Periodicalsdecision also considered the interpretation of GATT
111.25 Canada imposes an eighty percent excise tax on split-run periodicals-that
is, on magazines that share editorial content with a non-Canadian version and
that contain advertising not appearing in non-Canadian versions.26 The panel
considered whether imported split-run periodicals are a like product to domestic
non-split-run periodicals. It concluded that these two types of periodicals were
like products because the differentiating factors were "external to the Canadian
market." 27 As the Appellate Body vacated the panel's decision on this point,
however, this article III judgment is not legal precedent. 28
Another issue considered by the Periodicalspanel was whether Canada's higher
postal charges for imported magazines violates article 111:4. The panel began its
analysis by stating that "article III:1 constitutes part of the context of Article III:
4."29 The panel then concluded that the postal charges were affording domestic
production. This finding cemented a conclusion that the charges violate article III:
4.30 Thus, this transformation of article II: 1 from a precatory to mandatory requirement (in the context of article 111:4) is a significant development in WTO/GATT
22. Id. para. 6.18.
23. In the Canada Alcoholic Drinks case, the panel concluded that a tax solely on non-refillable
containers did not violate GATT article 111:2. Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, Feb. 18, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.)
at 27, paras. 5.33, 6.1(h), (1992).
24. Note that these taxes and regulations might be permitted by GATT article XX if the panel
determines that the measure fits a specific exception and that the discrimination is not arbitrary or
unjustifiable. This latter determination would involve an analysis very similar to the aim-and-effect
test.
25. Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals-Reportof the Panel, WT/DS31/R
(Mar. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Canada Periodicals Panel Report] (visited June 28, 1998) <http://
www.wto.org/wto/online/ddf.htm> [hereinafter WTO Website].
26. Id. para. 5.24.
27. Id. paras. 5.24, 5.26.
28. Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals-AB-1997-2-Reportof the Appellate
Body, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 25 [hereinafter Appellate
Body Periodical Decision].
29. Canada Periodicals Panel Report, supra note 25, para. 5.37. The panel cited the Appellate
Body for the proposition that "the purpose of Article III:1 is to establish this general principle as
a guide to understanding and interpreting the specific obligations contained in Article 111:2 and in
the other paragraphs of Article III .... "Id. para. 5.37 n. 152. While it is not clear what the Appellate
Body was referring to do, it seems likely that they were referring to the specific paragraphs of article
III that reference article 111:1, not to all parts of article III.
30. Id. para. 5.38. This finding was not reviewed by the Appellate Body.
FALL 1998
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jurisprudence. Indeed, it may make it harder for governments to apply environmental regulations that have an incidental effect of protecting domestic markets.
Before 1995, the discipline in article III:2's second sentence (regarding directly
competitive or substitutable products) had received little attention by GATT panels. 3' This discipline became an issue in the Japan Alcoholic Beverages case when
the panel concluded that Japan's different taxes on various alcoholic beverages violated this provision.32 Upon review, the Appellate Body criticized the panel's legal
conclusion because the panel had blurred the issue of dissimilar taxation with the
issue of whether the taxation was being applied so as to afford protection to domestic
production. " Nevertheless, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel's conclusion
34
that Japan's excise tax structure violated article III:2's second sentence.
Two aspects of the Appellate Body's decision in Alcoholic Beverageshave implications for environmental taxes. First, the Appellate Body clarified that a tax on
an imported product could be in excess of a tax on a competitive domestic product35
without necessitating a legal conclusion that the products are not similarly taxed.
This avoids a new WTO constraint on national taxes. Second, the Appellate Body
clarified that a determination under article III:1 and 111:2 as to whether a tax is
"applied so as to afford protection to domestic production" does not depend upon
the intent of the taxing authorities.36 Rather, the analysis should be objective: looking at the structure of the tax, the magnitude of the differential, and whether the
tax differential has trade-distorting effects. 37 The Appellate Body agreed with the
panel that Japan's taxes do afford protection to domestic production. 3"
In a subsequent report, the Appellate Body came out differently on the question
of whether the intent of the taxing authorities matters. 39 In Periodicals,the Appellate Body made a factual finding that the high excise tax on split-run periodicals
was applied so as to afford protection to domestic production. 40 The Appellate
Body based this finding on the size of the tax, a legislative task force report, a
governmental official's statement, a Governmental statement, and debate by a
minister in Parliament.4
GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 9, at 159-60.
32. Alcoholic Beverages Panel Report, supra note 18, para. 7. 1(ii).
33. Japan-Taxeson Alcoholic Beverages-AB-1996-2-Reportofthe Appellate Body, WT/DS8/
AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996), at WTO Website, supra note 25 [hereinafter Appellate Body Alcohol Decision].
34. Id. at 31.
35. Id. at 26, 27, 30.
36. Id. at 27-28 (noting that it is irrelevant that protectionism was not an intended objective).
37. Id. at 28-29.
38. Id.
39. None of the members of the division of the Appellate Body that decided the Japan Alcoholic
Beverages case were part of the division that decided the Canada Periodicalscase.
40. Appellate Body Periodical Decision, supra note 28, at 30-32.
41. Id. Although a WTO litigant cannot appeal a panel's factual determination, no rule prevents
the Appellate Body from making factual findings. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, (Apr. 15, 1994) Marrakesh Agreement; Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, article 17.6, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].

31.
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The Appellate Body's interpretation of article 111:2 can open new doors to
challenging policy-related taxes. 42 Given two products-an imported A and a
domestic B-a plaintiff need only show the following: (1) A and B are competitive,
(2) A and B are not similarly taxed, and (3) the tax differential has a trade
distorting effect. A non-protectionist intent would probably not be a defense.
For example, suppose A is a high-polluting automobile and B a low-polluting
one. Would a government be able to tax A higher than B? In Alcoholic Beverages,
the Appellate Body found that domestic production was being protected because
Japan was isolating domestically produced shochu from foreign competition.43
Yet in the U.S. Automobile case, the fact that European automobiles bore most
of the burden of the gas guzzler tax did not persuade that panel that this tax
afforded protection to U.S. domestic production." If the gas guzzler dispute
comes to the WTO in light of Alcoholic Beverages, it seems likely that the WTO
panel would find the U.S. gas guzzler tax to be a violation of GATT article III:
2's second sentence.
Before the advent of the WTO, it was unclear whether different production
methods could be used to demonstrate that products were unlike rather than like.
Although both Tuna-Dolphin decisions ruled that article III did not permit this,
these decisions were not adopted. 45 The Automobile Taxes panel ruled that "Article 111:4 does not permit treatment of an imported product less favourable than
that accorded to a like domestic product, based on factors not directly relating
to the product as such." 46 But this decision was also not adopted. The only
adopted decision on this point was Alcoholic Beverages-rulingthat a Minnesota
alcohol excise tax credit for micro breweries did not meet the requirements of
article 111:2 even though the credit was available to micro breweries in Canada.47
According to the panel, beer from these breweries was a like product to beer
from large breweries.
The new WTO jurisprudence builds on these adopted and unadopted rulings.
As noted above, the Gasoline panel rejected efforts by the U.S. government to

42. See Steve Charnovitz, Wl'O's "Alcoholic Beverages'"Decision, 6 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY
& INT'L ENVTL. L. 198, 201 (1997).

43. Appellate Body Alcohol Decision, supra note 33, at 31.
44. Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 13, para. 5.25
45. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Apr. 30, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.)
at 155, 195, para. 5.14, (1992) (stating that article III "covers" only products "as such"); United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, July 1, 1994, paras. 5.8-5.9, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994); Shinya
Murase, Perspectivesfrom InternationalEconomic Law on TransnationalEnvironmental Issues, 253
RECUEIL DES CouPs 287, 322-23 (1995).
46. United States-Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 13, para. 5.54.
47. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 17, para. 5.19. It is
unclear whether the U.S. government tried to defend this Minnesota statute. In an earlier GATT
case, the panel had viewed "manufacturing processes of products" as an objective criterion relevant
for ascertaining likeness under article 111: 2. See Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices
on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, Nov., 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83,
116, para. 5.7 (1987).
FALL 1998
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distinguish gasoline based on characteristics of the producer. 48 According to the
49
panel, this would be contrary to the "ordinary meaning" of article 1II:4. This
ruling is troubling because environmental policymaking relies on an ecosystem
approach that is not indifferent to how products are made. For example, virgin
paper is environmentally different from recycled paper, and wild-caught birds
are different from captive-bred birds.
At this time, GATT law on process-related distinctions remains unsettled. It
is now clear that producer characteristics are not allowable factors in determining
article III product likeness. There is no caselaw on characteristics of the exporting
country under article III, but it is reasonably clear that government policy of the
exporting country is not a factor in determining product likeness under GATT
article I.50 Whether article III likeness can be contingent on the way a specific
product is made is an open question. This issue of "odious" products did not
arise in the Gasoline or Alcohol cases.
2. Article XX
Before the advent of the WTO, several points had been settled in article XX
jurisprudence. 5 By its terms, article XX(b) requires that a qualifying measure
be "necessary." The Thailand Cigarette panel explained that a measure would
be considered necessary "only if there were no alternative measure consistent
with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could
reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives.' 5 2 In
other words, this test requires governments to use the least-GATT-inconsistent
measure that is reasonably available to achieve therein article XX(b) objective.53
48. See text accompanying supra note 11. But in a later paragraph, the panel suggested that so
long as gasoline was not distinguished by the country of origin, a regulatory scheme using foreign
refiner baselines would not necessarily contravene GATT article 111:4. Gasoline Panel Report, supra
note 11, para. 6.25.
49. Id. para. 6.12. The panel takes no note of the fact that article III discusses mixing and
processing regulations.
50. Belgian Family Allowances, Nov. 7, 1952, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 59, paras. 3, 8,
(1952). But there is a more recent contrary ruling. In the Fruitsand Vegetables case, the European
Commission was exempting tomato importers from paying a security deposit if the country of export
guaranteed a minimum import price and guaranteed to avoid trade deflection. The U.S. government
considered this regulation a violation of article I since it treated parties differently. The panel ruled that
since the Commission was imposing the same requirement on all countries, there was no discrimination
contrary to GATT article I. EEC-Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licenses and Surety
Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, Oct. 18, 1978, GATT B.I.S.D. (25th Supp.)
at 68, 89-90, 105-06, paras. 3.64-3.67, 4.19 (1978). It seems likely that a WTO panel would follow
Family Allowances.
51. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GA7T Article XX,
25 J. WORLD TRADE 37 (1991).
52. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT B.I.S.D.
(37th Supp.) at 200, 222, para. 75 (1990) [hereinafter Taxes on Cigarettes].
53. In a recent speech, the WTO Director General suggested that the WTO mandates that trade
measures for environmental purposes meet basic requirements relating to "least-traderestrictiveness." See Renato Ruggiero, A Shared Responsibility: Global Policy Coherence For Our
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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It had also been settled that article XX(g) applied to both the importation or
exportation of exhaustible natural resources and that, contrary to the technical
meaning of the term "exhaustible," fisheries could be considered exhaustible
resources.54 In the Canada Herring and Salmon case, the panel explained that
"relating," per article XX(g), meant that the measure had to be "primarily
aimed" at conservation and "primarily aimed" at rendering effective the parallel
domestic restrictions on production or consumption. 5 In the Automobile Taxes
case, the panel found that the use of origin-based fleet accounting to calculate
automotive fuel efficiency was not primarily aimed at the conservation of natural
resources.5 6 To the surprise of many observers, however, the panel also found
that the use of fleet averaging (which was dependent on facts unrelated to the
automobile as a product) was "primarily related" to conservation."
Although sparse, the article XX headnote has some pre-WTO jurisprudence. 5"
In one case, a panel suggested that a trade measure was not "disguised" since
it was "publicly announced as such." 5 9 In another case, the panel suggested that
a trade measure was not "disguised" since the exclusion order had been published
and there was due process. 60 These decisions have been criticized by commentators as being too permissive of protectionism.6 1
In the WTO Gasoline case, the panel considered whether the unwillingness
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to recognize foreign refinery
baselines was necessary under article XX(b). The panel concluded that it was
not necessary because allowing foreign baselines would be both feasible and

GlobalAge, WTO PRESS RELEASE, Dec. 9, 1997, at 3. It is unclear from GATT and WTO caselaw
where the Director-General finds this requirement. Given that an environmental case is currently
before a WTO panel, one wonders whether the Director-General is trying to persuade the panel to
tighten the WTO disciplines on environmental measures.
54. See United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT
B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91, 108-09, paras. 4.9, 4.12 (1990); Canada-Measures Affecting Exports
of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT B.I.S.D.(35th Supp.) at 98, 113, para. 4.4 (1987). In
both cases, the panel ultimately concluded that the trade measure did not qualify for the article XX(g)
exception. During the drafting of the Charter of the International Trade Organization in 1947, it
had been agreed that the term "exhaustible natural resources" would cover fisheries and wildlife;
see Charnovitz, supra note 51, at 46.
55. Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT B.I.S.D.
(35th Supp.) at 98, 113, para. 4.6 (1987). For further discussion, see Charnovitz, supra note 51,
at 50-5 1.
56. Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 13, paras. 5.60-5.61. For further discussion, see Steve
Charnovitz, The GATT Panel Decision on Automobile Taxes, 17 INT'L ENVT. REP. 921-25 (1994).
57. Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 13, para. 5.65.
58. The article XX headnote is also referred to as the "preamble" and the "chapeau."
59. United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, supra note
54, para. 4.8.
60. Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 107,
125, para. 56 (1993).
61. See, e.g., Aaditya Matoo & Petros Mavroidis, Trade, Environmentand the WTO: The Dispute
Settlement PracticeRelating to Article XX of GAiTT, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 334 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997).
FALL 1998
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less-GATT-inconsistent than the approach used by EPA.62 At no time did the
panel suggest that distinguishing gasoline according to the characteristics of the
producer would fail to meet article XX(b). With regard to article XX(g), the
panel found clean air to be an exhaustible natural resource.63 Without explaining
its reasoning, the panel also reached the conclusion that the less favorable treat6
ment of foreign gasoline was not primarily aimed at conservation. 1
The Appellate Body disagreed with the panel's conclusion and provided some
useful modifications of article XX(g) doctrine. First, the Appellate Body found
that the discriminatory baseline rules were primarily aimed at the conservation
of natural resources.65 Second, the Appellate Body interpreted article XX(g)
as requiring even-handedness regarding restrictions on imports versus domestic
production or consumption. 66 Third, the Appellate Body expounded that the
"made effective" clause in article XX(g) does not require an "empirical effects
test. "67 At the end of its analysis, the Appellate Body found that the EPA baseline
rules met the requirements of article XX(g).
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body concluded that the U.S. measure did not
qualify for article XX because it did not meet the terms of the headnote. This
decision provides several new and controversial interpretations regarding the
headnote. 6' First, the Appellate Body declared that the article XX exceptions
"should not be applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligation of the holder
of the right under the substantive rules" of the GATT.69 Second, it stated that
to qualify for an exception, a trade measure "must be applied reasonably." 70
Third, it suggested that the burden of persuasion for the headnote falls on the
party invoking the exception. 7
Unfortunately, the Appellate Body offers no analysis or evidence in support
of these treaty interpretations. For example, it does not explain how a legal right
for exporters to export can exist without regard to the legal right of importers
not to import. In other words, the Appellate Body's reasoning is circular in

62. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.25-6.28.
63. Id. para. 6.37.
64. Id. para. 6.40. For criticism of this ruling, see Steve Charnovitz, The WTO Panel Decision
on U.S. Clean Air Regulations, 19 INT'L ENVT. REP. 191, 194 (1996).
65. United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, May 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 603, 623 (1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body Gasoline Decision].
The Appellate Body also suggested that the "primarily aimed at" test was not treaty language and
should not be a litmus test.
66. Id. at 624.
67. Id. at 625. The Tuna-DolphinII panel had suggested an effects test. See Steve Charnovitz,
Dolphins and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GATT Panel Report, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10567,
10580 (1994).
68. For further discussion, see Steve Charnovitz, New WTO Adjudication and its Implications
for the Environment, 19 INT'L ENvT. REP. 851-54 (1996).
69. Appellate Body Gasoline Decision, supra note 65, at 626 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 626-27.
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suggesting that article XX must be interpreted to preserve legal rights (or maintain
72
legal obligations) which themselves can only be determined by article XX.
The Appellate Body also interpreted the conditions of the headnote. In one
73
constructive move, the Appellate Body apparently repudiated past adjudication
that had taken the teeth out of the headnote. 74 Less constructively, the Appellate
Body conflates the terms "arbitrary discrimination," "unjustifiable discrimination," and "disguised restriction" by suggesting that they are coincident.75 In
the instant case, the Appellate Body concluded that the EPA baseline rule did
not qualify for Article XX because it entailed "unjustified discrimination" and
a "disguised restriction" on international trade.76 The Appellate Body pointed
to two failures by the EPA that underlay this conclusion. One was that the EPA
did not adequately explore cooperation with the plaintiff governments. 77 The
other was that the EPA did not take into account the costs of its regulation to
foreign refiners.7"
This conclusion was unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, the Appellate Body
provided no evidence in support of its factual findings.79 Second, the Appellate
Body did not explain a legal basis for requiring the counting of foreign costs.
Finally, the Appellate Body did not explain why either of these failures demonstrated that the EPA's regulation was a disguised restriction on trade.
3. Technical Barriers
On top of these constraints, the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) imposes even more constraints on national environmental standards. 80 The
main disciplines are: (1) that imported products be accorded treatment no less
favorable than like products of national origin, and (2) that technical regulations
be no more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective such
as protection of the environment. 8' It should be noted that GATT article XX is
72. See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global
Environment, 83 GEO. L. J. 2131, 2194 (1995) (pointing out that in joining the GATT, importing
nations may have retained the right to use environmental trade measures).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
74. Appellate Body Gasoline Decision, supra note 65, at 629.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 633.
77. Id. at 631-32.
78. Id. at 632.
79. Charnovitz, supra note 68, at 853. Because the panel had not discussed the headnote, there
was no factual record for the Appellate Body to draw upon.
80. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), available in LEXIS, Itrade Library, Gatt
File [hereinafter TBT]. These apply to only to regulations, not to taxes or import bans.
81. Id. arts. 2.1, 2.2. The first discipline is analagous to the GATT article 111:4 national treatment
requirement. Thus, if a future panel interprets article 111:4 so as to prohibit regulations that distinguish
products based on the way the product is made, this interpretation could carry over into TBT adjudication. If so, such regulations would violate TBT even though such regulations might not violate the
GATT because of the saving force of article XX. The legal situation is unclear because TBT only
applies to regulations on "product characteristics or their relatedprocesses and production methods."
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not available as a defense for violations of these TBT disciplines. 8 2 So far, no
WTO panel has interpreted the TBT disciplines.
4. Summary
The new article XX jurisprudence provides good news and bad news for environmentalists. The good news is that it will be easier to meet the terms of section
(g). The bad news is that it will be very hard to meet the terms of the headnote s3
The Appellate Body has shown a willingness to invent new requirements for the
headnote that do not exist in the text and to apply them arbitrarily. Looking at
this jurisprudence as a whole, there would seem to be little basis for the conclusion
that GATT rules place essentially no constraints on a country's right to protect
its own environment.

B. WTO

CONSTRAINTS ON DOMESTIC HEALTH POLICY

Before the advent of the WTO, trade jurisprudence had recognized that article
XX(b) allows governments "to give priority to human health over trade liberalization. "4 The new WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), 85 however, has the potential to change this priority. The
SPS Agreement contains several new disciplines on national health
measures
86
(applying to imports) that are less laissez-rggler than the GATT.
In the first SPS dispute to come before the WTO, the EU Hormone case, the
Appellate Body found that a European Commission food safety measure violates

Id. Annex 1.1 (emphasis added). Some analysts have inferred that this definition means that TBT
does not apply to regulations on processes and production methods that are "unrelated" to the product
qua product. Others assume that TBT disallows such regulations. See, e.g., World Business Council
for Sustainable Development, THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT BULLETIN, March 1998, at 3.
82. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1144, (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement] Annex I(stating that Agreements like TBT would
prevail over the GATT to the extent they are in conflict).
83. See Anna Beth Snoderly, Clearing the Air: EnvironmentalRegulation, Dispute Resolution,
and Domestic Sovereignty Under the World Trade Organization, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
241, 296 (1996) (suggesting that domestic environmental sovereignty may be encroached by the
WTO).
84. See Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note 52, at 200, 222.
85. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994) [hereinafter SPS].
86. For a discussion of these disciplines, see John J. Barcel, Product Standards to Protect the
Local Environment-The GATT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and PhytosanitaryAgreement, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 755 (1994); Steve Charnovitz, The North American Free Trade Agreement:
Green Law or Green Spin?, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1, 71-73 (1994) (comparing the SPS
provisions in the WTO with those in the NAFTA). Note that SPS only governs health measures
applied to imports. In practice, this establishes a discipline for all health measures since it would
be pointless for a government to ban a health risk from a domestic product if the government allows
the same risky product to be imported.
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SPS because it was not "based on" a risk assessment. 87 The case involved complaints by the Canadian and U.S. governments about an EU import ban on meat
produced from animals fattened with growth hormones. Given the factual record
of the case, the Appellate Body's decision to uphold the first-level panel seems
justified.88 Yet the Appellate Body makes several legal rulings that may make
it harder for governments to safeguard domestic health. 8 9
A key issue before the Appellate Body was the appropriate standard of review,
that is, whether deference should be given to the EU's regulatory determination.
The European Commission argued that the panel should have accorded deference. 90 In deciding that no deference is required, the Appellate Body points to the
directive in the Dispute Settlement Understanding that panels make an "objective
assessment of the facts,"- 9' and concludes that deference is incompatible with
this responsibility. 92 Since the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement requires deference
by dispute panels,93 the WTO is in the odd position of deferring to national
judgments of economic interest, but not to national judgments of health interest.
The Appellate Body also holds that using international standards does not
provide a shield against an SPS challenge. The SPS Agreement states that national
measures that conform to international standards shall be deemed to be necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent
with the relevant provisions of this [SPS] Agreement and of GATT 1994."94
Without analysis, the Appellate Body interprets "presumed" as denoting merely

87. GATT Report of the Appellate Body on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/12, WT/DS48/10, para. 253(1) (Jan. 16, 1998) at WTO Website, supra note
25 [hereinafter Appellate Body Hormone Decision].
88. See GA7TReport ofthe PanelECMeasuresConcerningMeatand Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 25 [hereinafter Hormone Panel
Report]. For commentary on this panel report, see Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization,
Meat Hormones, and Food Safety, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 1781 (1997); Hiranya Fernando Senadhira,
Appellate Body Report of the Beef Hormone Case: A Brief Legal Analysis, 2 BRIDGES 9 (Jan.-Feb.
1998), available on < http://www.ictsd.org >.
89. The Appellate Body also considered whether the precautionary principle had matured into
a customary rule of international law. The representatives from the European Commission claimed
that it had, while the representatives from Canada and the United States denied that it had. Given
that difference of view, the Appellate Body concluded that the status of the precautionary principle
in international law still awaits authoritative formulation. See Appellate Body Hormone Decision,
supra note 87, paras. 120-25. The decision by the Canadian and U.S. governments to shun the
precautionary principle contributed to their victory in this case. But one wonders whether this tactic
will pay off in the long run as these two governments try to persuade developing countries to take
action to head off global warming.
90. Id. para. 110.
91. DSU, supra note 41, article 11.
92. Appellate Body Hormone Decision, supra note 87, paras. 117, 119.
93. Id. para. 114; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, article 17.6(i), April 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, Itrade Library, Gatt
File.
94. SPS, supra note 85, para 3.2 (emphasis added).
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a rebuttable presumption.95 This interpretation will enable challenges to international health standards seeking to rebut this presumption.
In other areas, the Appellate Body takes a more laissez-r~glerapproach. Most
notably, it overrules a decision of the Hormone panel that would have undercut
national health regulation. 96 This decision involved SPS article 5.5 on regulatory
harmonization, which requires each member government to "avoid arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels [of health protection] it considers to be
appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade." 97 After comparing the way the
EU regulates the use of hormones for animal growth to the way it regulates other
substances, the panel concluded that article 5.5 was being violated.98 The panel
found that in regulating growth hormones differently than the antimicrobial Carbadox, the EU was engendering "discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.' 99 This finding was criticized by commentators because the panel
offered no basis for it.'t° The Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding as
being unjustified and erroneous.101
Unfortunately, the Appellate Body failed to reverse a related finding by the
panel that there is an arbitrary or unjustifiable difference in the EU's chosen
levels of protection against hormones and Carbadox.'0° Instead, the Appellate
Body affirmed the panel after reviewing and rejecting the seven justifications
offered by the European Commission. 03This outcome is perplexing. In an earlier
section of its decision, the Appellate Body clearly stated that the complaining
party has the burden of proving a violation of any SPS provision, including article
5.5.' °' Indeed, the Appellate Body concluded that the panel misallocated this
burden and held this to be an error in law. 05 But, in affirming the panel's application of the arbitrary and unjustifiable test, the Appellate Body seems to overlook
the fact that the panel reached its conclusion by assigning the burden of proof
to the defending party, that is, the European Commission.'°6 According to the
panel, "the European Communities has not met its burden ofjustifying the distinc-

95. Appellate Body Hormone Decision, supra note 87, para. 170. The Appellate Body takes no
note of the fact that a similar provision in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade uses the
term "rebuttably presumed" to signify a rebuttable presumption. See TBT, supra note 80, article
2.5.
96. Appellate Body Hormone Decision, supra note 87, para. 253(m).
97. Hormone Panel Report, supra note 88.
98. Id. para. 9.1(ii).
99. Id. para. 8.241.
100. See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 88, at 1783-86.
101. Appellate Body Hormone Decision, supra note 87, para. 246.
102. Id. para. 235; Hormone Panel Report, supra note 88, para. 8.238. The Appellate Body is
slightly narrower in finding only an unjustifiable difference.
103. Appellate Body Hormone Decision, supra note 87, paras. 226-35.
104. Id. para. 109.
105. Id. para. 108.
106. Hormone Panel Report, supra note 88, paras. 8.227-8.238.
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tion it makes in levels of protection."' 07 Had the panel assigned the burden to
the plaintiffs, the outcome might have been different.
Another important Appellate Body judgment involved the SPS rule that measures be "based on" a risk assessment. The panel enforced this rule by looking
for procedural evidence that the European Commission had actually taken a risk
assessment into account.'0 8 This line of inquiry was rejected by the Appellate
Body as not in accord with the SPS.'09 In addition, the Appellate Body correctly
rejected this line of inquiry because the panel's approach is very meddlesome
to national decisionmaking.
The Appellate Body gave a different gloss to "based on" than the panel. The
panel looked at whether the health measures "conform" to the risk assessment. "0
The Appellate Body suggested a more lenient test-namely, whether there is a
"rational relationship" between the measure and the risk assessment. "' Applying
this test, the Appellate Body found that the available risk assessments "do not
rationally support the EC import prohibition."".2
The Appellate Body also seems to take a more laissez-r~glerposition than the
panel on the issue of whether a government may regulate in the absence of an
identifiable risk greater than zero." 3 This portion of the Appellate Body's decision
is not clear. The Appellate Body might be saying that there is no required minimum
quantitative showing of risk. 114Alternatively, the Appellate Body might be restating the obvious by saying that unquantifiable risks may be part of a risk assessment. " 5
Finally, the Appellate Body throws in a wild card by stating that SPS article
3 recognizes and safeguards the "right and duty" of WTO member governments
107. Id. para. 8.238 (emphasis added).
108. Id. paras. 8.113-8.116. For criticism, see Charnovitz, supra note 88, at 1782.
109. Appellate Body Hormone Decision, supra note 87, paras. 188-91. For example, the panel
had pointed out that the preambles to EU directives did not mention scientific studies. The Appellate
Body makes clear that preambles are not normally used to demonstrate that a government has complied
with its international obligations. Id. para. 191.
110. Hormone Panel Report, supra note 88, paras. 8.137, 8.156.
111. Appellate Body Hormone Decision, supra note 87, para. 193. In reaching this conclusion,
the Appellate Body points to a principle of international law (dubio mitius) holding that if a meaning
of a treaty term is ambiguous, the preferred meaning is the one that is less onerous to the party
assuming an obligation. Id. para. 165 n. 154. Yet the Appellate Body's citations are selective. Compare
H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretationand the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretationof
Treaties, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48, 59-63 (1949) (suggesting that continued reference to dubio mitius
is a source of confusion that deserves greater discouragement than it has received), with Lord McNair,
Treaties and Sovereignty, in THE LAW OF TREATIES, 765-66 (1961) (suggesting that the rule of
restrictive interpretation is of declining importance and of doubtful value). See also Layla Hughes,
Limiting the Jurisdiction of Dispute Settlement Panels: The WTO Appellate Body Beef Hormone
Decision, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 915, 921-22 (1998) (criticizing the Appellate Body's use
of dubio mitius).
112. Appellate Body Hormone Decision, supra note 87, para 197.
113. See Charnovitz, supra note 88, at 1782.
114. See Appellate Body Hormone Decision, supra note 87, paras. 184, 186.
115. See id. paras. 185, 187.
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to protect the life and health of their people. 116 It is unclear whether the Appellate
Body is suggesting that governments whose trade-related health standards are
too low have an article 3 duty to raise those standards. Although little attention
has been given to this provision, the requirement in article 3.1 that sanitary and
phytosanitary measures be based on international standards, can be read to imply
an obligation of upward harmonization.'
The growing public concern over food safety suggests that there will be more
SPS cases in the next few years. "8 Panels will face the challenge to provide trade
justice while avoiding decisions that turn food safety and consumer groups against
the WTO. The sensitivity of governments to WTO supervision can be seen in
the U.S. and EU press releases following the Appellate Body's Hormone decision-both sides claimed victory. " 9 Depending on how WTO adjudication
evolves, there may be a need to change SPS rules. 2
C. WTO

CONSTRAINTS ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Both Tuna-Dolphinpanels suggested that governments could not use unilateral
trade measures to pursue international environmental policy objectives.' This
issue is now before the Turtle-Shrimp panel considering a U.S. law barring the
importation of shrimp in certain situations so as to protect migratory sea turtles.
No WTO panel reports have discussed international environmental policies.
Such policies may come up in the context of disputes about eco-labeling. The
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade contains new disciplines that apply
to labeling; however, these have yet to be interpreted. 2 While the WTO is
amenable to labels indicating the country of origin, some analysts think it would
23
be less amenable to labels indicating a product's cradle-to-grave impact.

116. Id. para. 177 (emphasis added).
117. This situation would raise interesting issues of standing to enforce such an obligation.
118. See Stephanie Hall, Food Fight: Safety Fears Grow Along With Trade, J. CoM., Jan. 5,
1998, at IA.
119. Appellate Body Finds EC Hormone Ban Inconsistent with WTO Obligations under SPS
Agreement, Jan. 15, 1998, USTR Press Release No. 98-02 (1998); WTO Ruling on EU Hormone
Ban is a Victory for European Consumers, Jan. 16, 1998, European Commission Delegation Press
Release No. 4/98 (1998).
120. But see U.S. Will Oppose Any EU Bid to Reopen WTO SPS Pact to Address Consumer Fears,

15 INT'L TRADE REP. 267 (1998).
121. See generally Chang, supra note 72, at 2139-2209 (summarizing these panel reports and
critiquing them).
122. See generally Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of
EnvironmentalLabeling and Its Role in the "Greening" of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
205 (1996).
123. See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO:
Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 244 (1997) (noting that many
developing countries favor restricting the use of eco-labeling); DAVID VOGEL, BARRIERS OR BENEFITS?
REGULATION IN TRANSATLANTIC TRADE 50 (1997) (stating the U.S. government is firmly convinced

the EU eco-labeling program violates international trade law). See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
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III. Procedural Issues in Environmental Disputes
Disputes about the environment and health are different than typical trade
disputes. While all trade disputes involve the interests of particular individuals,
environmental disputes have a wider range of ecological or social impact. Contrast, for example, the GATT decision on Copper Scrap with the Tuna-Dolphin
decisions. This difference in the range and depth of interests has implications
for the procedures used in dispute resolution. Seven issues will be discussed
below: (A) Mediation, (3) Selection of Panelists, (C) Technical Advice, (D)
Public Input, (E) Intergovernmental Organization Input, (F) Voting Rules, and
(G) Alternative Fora.
A. MEDIATION

The DSU provides for "good offices, conciliation and mediation" when undertaken voluntarily by the parties of a dispute. 124 In addition, the WTO DirectorGeneral may take the initiative to offer good offices.' 25 In many of the past
environment-related trade disputes, neutral observers found both sides partially
right. Yet, in settling the dispute via the application of GATT law, the parties
miss out on the opportunity to reach integrative solutions.
One way the WTO might head off the public controversies entailed in environment-related disputes is to make better use of the good offices of the WTO
Director-General. For example, the Director General might appoint a judge, or
diplomat, or academic-with experience in trade and environment-to work with
both sides to fashion a compromise solution. Had this been done in the TurtleShrimp dispute, the mediator could have tried to get the complaining parties to
improve their protection of turtles and tried to get the defendant party to negotiate
a compromise.
B.

SELECTION OF PANELISTS

The DSU states that panelists must be "well-qualified" individuals and that
members of a panel should be selected with a view to ensuring "a sufficiently
diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience." 12 6 Thus, while individuals with experience in environmental regulation may serve on a panel, there is
no requirement that panels hearing cases about environmental laws have such
experience. In the environment and health cases decided in 1996-97, it appeared
as though none of the panelists had regulatory experience.

InternationalTrade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Searchfor Reconciliation,

91 AM. J, INT'L L. 268, 295 (1997) (suggesting that the WTO would rule against a requirement
that wood from tropical forests be so labeled).
124. DSU, supra note 41, article 5:1.

125. Id. article 5:6.
126. Id. article 8.
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When the WTO reviews the DSU this year, proposals could be made for
changing the rules so as to require technically qualified panels in disputes affecting
environment or health. This might give a panel more capacity to carry out its
responsibility of making an "objective" fact assessments. One precedent might be
the provision in DSU article 8.10, which allows developing country governments
involved in WTO disputes to insist that at least one panelist be from a developing
country. The idea behind this selection factor presumably is not that this panelist
will favor a developing country litigant, but rather that he may have a fuller
understanding of its position.
C.

TECHNICAL ADVICE

The DSU states that a panel may seek information from any individual or body
which it deems appropriate, and that for scientific and technical matters, a panel
may establish an expert review group." 7 In the Gasoline dispute, the panel did
not set up an expert review group and did not seek outside information. On the
other hand, in the Hormone dispute, the panel set up an expert review group.
Finally, in the Turtle-Shrimp dispute, the panel has sought the advice of experts.
Outside information or expert review groups are particularly important when
panels need to make findings involving technical judgments. For example, in
the Gasoline report, the panel made key factual findings regarding the EPA's
ability to determine gasoline origin and to verify foreign producer baselines. 28
'
These findings may have been correct, but the record contained little support.
D.

PUBLIC INPUT

The parties in GATTIWTO adjudication are Member governments. Although

it was recognized at least as early as 1902 that states could use international
tribunals to espouse the interests of private parties, 29 such adjudication is still
formalistically viewed as state-to-state. The public, however, sees through this
legal fiction. For example, while the recent WTO dispute over the film market
was technically between the United States and Japan, 30 much of the press characterized it as a dispute between Kodak and Fuji.''
Although governments can espouse private interests in WTO dispute settle127. Id. article 13.
128. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 11, paras. 6.26, 6.28.
129. See Pious Funds Case (Mex. v. U.S.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) I (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1902).
130. Japan-MeasuresAffecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, Report of the Panel,
WT/DS44 (Apr. 22, 1998), at WTO Website, supra note 25.
131. See, e.g., WTO Backs Fuji, NAT'L L. J. Dec. 22, 1997, at A10; USA Still Ahead at WTO
Despite Kodak's Defeat, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 10, 1997, at 24A; Shin Sato, Fuji Wins; Kodak Loses
in WTO Suit, THE DAILY YoMIumu, Dec. 7, 1997, at 1; WTO Rules in Favorof Fuji in Dispute with
Kodak, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 5, 1997, at 7B; WTO's Kodak Ruling Heightens Trade Tension, WALL
S.J., Dec. 8, 1997, at A3.
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ment, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are looking for more direct
input opportunities. None of the WTO panels considering environmental or health
issues, nor the Appellate Body, have called a public hearing or invited NGO
amicus briefs. Some NGOs have submitted amicus briefs anyway, 32 but there
is no evidence that the panels read the briefs. Nonetheless, the DSU rules do
33
not preclude such public involvement.
The need for NGO input is particularly strong on matters in which the participating governments are not espousing important NGO views. 34 Moreover, since
the public does not yet have full access to all of the briefs submitted by governments, NGOs have difficulty knowing whether their views are being espoused.
As several commentators pointed out, procedures could easily be adopted to
35
provide NGOs the opportunity to submit information to panels.
Individual citizens might also be given a right to lodge complaints in the WTO
against trade actions by their own or another government. 136 At present, if the
U.S. government forbids the export of a particular product to Country X, the
only complainant could be the Government of X whose importers are being
frustrated. However, X might not consider its interest sufficient to warrant a
WTO tangle with the United States. In that situation, a more liberal trading system
might give standing to citizens of the United States or Country X to challenge
37
the GATT-legality of the export ban and its enforcement.1
132. See, e.g., WWF, WWF Amicus Brief to WTO Shrimp-Turtle Dispute, 1997.
133. Article 14.1 of the DSU states that panel deliberations shall be confidential. This, however,
would not prevent public hearings. Appendix 3(2) of the DSU says that the panel shall meet in closed
session. This could be interpreted loosely to allow an informal public hearing. Alternatively, a panel
could rely upon DSU article 13.1 which authorizes panels to seek information "from any individual
or body which it deems appropriate."
134. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Non-GovernmentalOrganizationsat the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT'L. EcON. L. 123, 132-37 (1998); see also
Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 289 (1997) (noting that the web of potential relationships between private
parties, supranational entities, and domestic governments lies at the heart of supranational adjudication).
135. See, e.g., Matthew Schaefer, Non-Identical Yet Twin Challenges for the World Trading
System: Further Advancing the Rule of Law and Legitimacy, PROC. CAN. COUNCIL ON INT'L L.
(forthcoming 1998). Some commentators go further in suggesting that private parties be able to lodge
complaints. See Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims
Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275 (1997); PETER UIMONEN
& JOHN WHALLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 122 (1997)
(suggesting that NGO participation be made a regular part of panel deliberations).
136. See Marin Lukas, The Role of Private Parties in the Enforcement of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 181, 202-06 (Oct. 1995). See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM,
supra note 61, at 115 (suggesting that individuals should be able to invoke WTO rules in domestic
courts).
137. See Bill Mongelluzzo, Obey or Pay: Customs Targets Rules Violations, J. CoM., Jan. 26,
1998, at IA (noting that the U.S. government is punishing violators with multi-million-dollar fines,
seizure of assets, and jail terms).
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION INPUT

In the Thailand Cigarette case, the GATT panel consulted the World Health
Organization pursuant to an agreement of the parties. 38 This action was consistent
with the provision in GATT article XXIII:2 authorizing the GATT to consult
with appropriate intergovernmental organizations regarding disputes. However,
the DSU does not specifically provide for such consultation even though it seems
permissible under the power of panels "to seek information.' 139 Because intergovernmental organizations for the environment could provide useful input
to panels, it might be helpful to clarify that WTO panels can seek advice from
such organizations (e.g., the U.N. Environment Programme) as well as "information."
F.

VOTING RULES

The DSU does not specify internal voting rules for panels. WTO panel reports
are unclear as to whether decisions are unanimous.140 Presumably at least two
of the three panelists agree with each panel's decision. To give more weight to
non-commercial values, the DSU rules could be changed to require any determination that national environmental or health measures violate the WTO must be
made by a panel unanimously.
G.

ALTERNATIVE FORA

Another way of handling contentious environmental issues would be to shift
them to another forum. Richard J. McLaughlin suggested that trade disputes
about marine living resources be adjudicated in the tribunal established by the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.' 4 McLaughlin points out several advantages of this tribunal over42 the WTO including that it would comprise individuals
with relevant expertise.
IV. Conclusion
The supervision of environmental and health laws that affect trade is a responsibility of the WTO, but one that it needs to carry out more effectively. The
Appellate Body has stated that "WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy
to determine their own policies on the environment (including its relationship
with trade), their environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they
138. Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note 52.
139. DSU, supra note 41, article 13.
140. There were at least two GATT panels that revealed non-unanimity. See "Dissenting Opinions" in GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 9, at 755 (WTO ed., 1995).
14 1. Richard J. McLaughlin, Settling Trade-RelatedDisputesover the Protectionof Marine Living

Resources: UNCLOS or the WTO?, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 29 (1997).
142. Id. at 69-71, 79-81.
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enact and implement.' ' 143 But these soothing words have been contradicted by
some of the decisions taken by the Appellate Body as detailed above. Environmentalists do not have confidence in the current WTO dispute system. If the WTO
aspires to ensure the rule of law, it should give more attention to deficiencies
in its adjudications. Improving the DSU will be important not only to elicit the
right outcomes from trade adjudication but also to assure continuing public support
for the world trading system.

143. Appellate Body Gasoline Decision, supra note 65, at 634.
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